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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOM WATKINS, an individual 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HENRY DAY FORD, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Appellate Court Case No. 
20090542 
Appellee, Henry Day Ford ("Henry Day Ford") hereby submits its Appellee's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)0). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §78A-3-102(4). The Utah Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §78A-3-
102(2)0). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory issues to be decided in this Appeal. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Henry Day Ford does not dispute the time line of this matter as set forth in the 
"Statement of the Case" presented by Watkins in his Brief. Watkins' references to prior 
summary judgment motions, however, are irrelevant as all issues, including those raised in 
summary judgment motions, were decided at trial. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Watkins' Brief Included References to Evidence Not Offered at 
Trial. 
Appellant, Tom Watkins' ("Watkins") Brief references evidence which was not 
admitted or even presented at trial. Specifically, Watkins references "Trade Journals / 
Automotive Publications" listed as Addenda "E", "F" and "G" to Watkins' Brief. (See 
Watkins's Brief, page V and p. 23). It has been held "As an appellate court, our 'power of 
review is strictly limited to the record presented on appeal." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 
UT 99, f 16, 17 P.3d 1110. Accordingly, this Court may not review evidence that 
was not presented to the district court and must disregard any newly presented materials 
improperly included in a party's brief. See UtahR. App. P. Ufa) (describing composition 
of the record on appeal); see also Tillman v. State. 2005 UT 56, f 14 n. 5, 128 P.3d 1123.l 
B. Watkins' Statement of Facts Failed to Fully Reflect the Record on 
Issues Raised in his Appeal. 
The first paragraph of Watkins's' Statement of Facts states: 
At the 2002 North American International Auto Show in 
Detroit, in January 2002, Ford Motor Company unveiled the 
Ford GT40 concept car, which was based on the Ford GT40 
1
 Henry Day Ford is not accusing Watkins of deception, and notes that Watkins' 
present attorney did not represent Watkins at trial. 
2 
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that Ford had built and successfully raced in the mid -1960's 
at LeMans....Ford announced that it intended to put the 
concept car, which it identified at the Detroit Auto show as 
the GT40, into production and that it would manufacture a 
limited number of the vehicles. 
(Watkins Brief pg.5, referencing Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 38:20-39:16 and 54:9-17.) 
Watkins, however, fails to indicate the Henry Day Ford hearsay objection to the 
referenced testimony (Tr 39:19-21) and the trial court's ruling on the objection, that the 
referenced statements were not "received for the truth of the matter asserted". (Tr. 40:4-10). 
C Watkins Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence. 
It has been held that the process of marshaling the evidence on appeal is 
fundamentally different from that of presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party 
must "temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; he 
or she must play the 'devil's advocate'." Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, f 19, 57 P.3d 1093. 
In so doing, appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court. 
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228,232 (Utah 1998). As demonstrated below, . 
Watkins failed to marshal the evidence. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Henry Day Ford submits the following additional facts are relevant and necessary to 
address in this appeal: 
1. At page 5 of his Brief, Watkins states: "Tom Watkins, who owns a motor 
vehicle dealership, although not a Ford dealership...55. It is relevant to note that this 
statement far understates Watkins5 involvement and experience in the automobile industry, 
especially considering that this case, in large part, revolves around the formation and 
3 
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execution of standard Motor Vehicle Contact of Sale (the "Contracts", Trial Exhibits 1 -4 and 
Appendices 1 and 2 hereto). Watkins testified, relevant to this issue, as follows: 
a. Watkins had been involved in the automobile industry 
since he was 15 years old (Testimony of Watkins, Tr. 35:2) 
and had been an automobile dealer since 1989 (Tr. 34:23). 
b. Watkins had been the used car manager for a General 
Motors dealership (Tr. 35:22-24). 
c. Watkins purchased Volkswagen Intermountain 
dealership in 1989 and thereafter became responsible for all 
aspects of that business. (Tr. 36:3-15.) And, 
d. Watkins had also operated Isuzu, Land Rover, and 
Hyundai automobile franchises. (Tr. 36:20-22.) 
2. Watkins states at page 5 of his Brief that "Mr. Kersey subsequently advised 
Watkins that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one, perhaps two GT40s...." Watkins, 
however, failed to reference Mr. Kersey's testimony on this issue. Mr. Kersey was asked if 
he called or asked anyone to inquire as to whether the dealership was going to be allocated 
any Ford GT40' s in the first meeting with Watkins. Mr. Kersey testified: "It was a Saturday, 
No, I couldn't call Ford Motor because the main office was closed." (Tr. 116:21-25.) Mr. 
Kersey also testified that he did not contact Ford at any subsequent meeting with Watkins. 
(Tr. 119:2-4.) 
3. Watkins acknowledged in his Brief that the Contracts, dated March 4, 2002 
specifically provide that the automobiles to be purchased were "Ford GT40". (Watkins 
Brief, page 6.) The Contracts provided in at least three (3) places that Watkins specifically 
intended to purchase a GT40. (Tr. 75:22-25; Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
4. Watkins read the Contracts after they were prepared. (Tr. 120:1 -3.) 
4 
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5. Watkins testified he had completed a number of Motor Vehicle Sales 
Contracts (Tr. 69:9-11) and testified that it is important that the Contracts be prepared 
accurately and completely. (Tr. 69:17-19, 76:1-3.) 
6. Watkins offered to put a deposit of $ 1,000.00 on each of the Ford GT40s that 
he wanted to purchase from Henry Day Ford. The Contracts clearly referenced the deposit. 
(Tr. 77:13-14; Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
7. Each of the Contracts reference a "Cash Down Payment" of $ 1,000.00 for the 
GT40s. (See Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
8. The deposits were made by Watkins to "secure the deal". (Tr. 77:21-24.) 
9. The $1,000.00 deposits were part of the Contracts. (Tr. 78:23-25; Trial 
Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
10. The Contracts would not have been written by the parties without the deposit. 
(Tr. 79:15-19.) 
11. Watkins signed the Contracts (Trial Exhibits 1 -2; Appendix 1) and delivered 
a check to Henry Day Ford in the amount of $2,000.00 for the cash down payment required 
and reflected in the Contracts. (Trial Exhibits 1-2; Appendix 1.) 
12. Initially the Contracts as prepared, read, and signed did not contain a purchase 
price for the GT40's. (Trial Exhibits 1-2; Appendix 1.) 
13. Watkins called Henry Day Ford the day following the execution of the 
Contracts and requested that the Contracts be amended to include the words "purchase for 
MSRP". (Tr. 50:14-18.) 
5 
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14. Henry Day Ford complied with Watkins5 request and amended the contracts 
to include the MSRP as the purchase price. (Trial Exhibits 3-4; Appendix 2.) 
15. In 2002, Henry Day Ford, during its year-end review of financial records, 
discovered that Henry Day Ford had held Watkins' deposit for over eight (8) months. (Tr. 
141:16-18) 
16 It was unusual for Henry Day Ford to hold a customer's deposit for over eight 
(8) months. (Tr. 141:19-23) 
17. Jeremy Day, general manager of Henry Day Ford, called the Ford 
Representative and inquired as to whether the dealership would be allocated any Ford 
GT40's. (Tr. 139:13-15.) 
18. Ford informed Henry Day Ford that it would not be allocated a Ford GT40 
unless it won either the President's Award or the Share of the Nation Award. (Tr.l39:23-
25.) 
19. In its 40 year history, Henry Day Ford had never won either the President's 
Award or the Share of the Nation Award. (Tr. 151:2-6.) 
20. It was impossible for Henry Day Ford to know on December 31, 2002 if it 
was ever going to win either the President's Award or the Share of the Nation Award. (Tr. 
127:20-23.) 
21. Based upon the above Henry Day Ford, on December 31,2002, prepared and 
mailed to Watkins a letter in which it stated: u[e]nclosed please find a check for the refund 
6 
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of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to 
allow us to receive this vehicle." (Watkins' Brief Addendum C.) 
22. Watkins acknowledged the return of his $2,000.00 and deposited the check 
into his bank account. (Tr. 52:24-25.) 
23. Henry Day Ford, upon the return of Watkins's deposit to Watkins, considered 
the Contracts terminated. (Tr. 152:4-6.) 
24. At the time of Watkins' Complaint, Watkins acknowledged that he did not 
"expect to receive delivery of the Ford GTs for many months". (Tr. 81:1-4; Watkins' 
Complaint 120, R.L) 
25. Watkins did not contact Henry Day Ford after receiving a return of his 
deposit. (Tr. 80:7-9.) 
26. Watkins knew that if Henry Day Ford did not receive the Ford GT40 
referenced in the Contracts that Henry Day Ford had no obligation to sell the Ford GT40 to 
Watkins. (Tr. 52:1-3.) 
27. The Contracts provided for the purchase of a "Ford GT40". At no time after 
the Contracts were executed did Watkins request that the Contracts be amended to reflect 
that Watkins desired to purchase a "Ford GT". (Tr. .71:17-20.) 
28. Watkins, in an affidavit filed with the trial court and in his deposition, stated 
that he had seen a Ford GT40 at Butterfield Ford after he executed the subject Contracts. At 
trial, Watkins stated that he had "misspoke" when he made the statement regarding the Ford 
GT40 at Butterfield. (Tr. 72:21-23, 73:17:20.) 
7 
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29. Watkins signed his deposition without referencing the above 'misstatement'. 
(Tr. 74:1-2.) 
30. In the past, Ford has manufactured cars, marketed them, and then later 
reintroduced the car back into the market. (Tr. 74:13-14.) 
31. It was possible that Ford could, in the future, manufacture and produce a Ford 
GT40. (Tr. 74:22-24.) 
32. Henry Day Ford offered to sell Watkins a Ford GT for MSRP in 2005. 
Watkins declined to purchase the vehicle from Henry Day Ford. (Tr. 107:15-17.) 
33. Henry Day Ford became aware that it had received the Share of the Nation 
Award from Ford in February 2004 based upon Henry Day Ford's car and truck sales during 
the 2003 calendar year. (Tr. 123:123:23-25,124:1-5.) 
34. Henry Day Ford first became aware that it had received the President's Award 
from Ford in February 2004. (Tr. 125:9-12.) 
3 5. Ford has manufactured other models of GT type vehicles other than the Ford 
GT and GT40, including the GT Heritage. (Tr. 137:22-25, 138:1-2, 138:14.) 
36. Henry Day Ford has never had a Ford GT40 to sell. (Tr. 139:2-3.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Contracts at issue in this case are clear and unambiguous. Utah law, where a 
contract is intended to be a final expression of the parties' bargain is clear. The trial court's 
conclusion that the Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a 
final and complete expression of the parties' bargain is supported by recent court 
decisions. 
8 
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The Appellate Courts of this State have addressed the principles to be used by 
trial courts in interpreting a written contract in no less than six (6) cases in the past 
year. In each of these cases, it has been held that a "court first looks to the contract's 
four corners to determine the intent of the parties. 
The terms of the Contracts, as a matter of law, may not be altered or 
'explained' by the parties. The parties' failure to include certain terms, however, 
does not allow the specific terms of the Contracts to be explained. The parties were 
free to leave open terms in the contract, and the conduct by both parties recognizing 
the existence of the Contracts is sufficient to establish a contract for sale. 
It is undisputed that the parties' Contracts were fully integrated. At the time 
the contract was made/entered into, the intent of the parties was the purchase of a 
Ford GT40 made to the exact specifications presented at the auto show by Watkins. 
It is undisputed that Watkins wanted to purchase a Ford GT40. In fact, when Henry 
Day Ford later offered to sell Watkins a Ford GT, Watkins refused. 
Extrinsic evidence cannot be used when the four corners of a contract do not 
contain a facial ambiguity. The trial court concluded from the evidence and testimony 
presented that the language in the Contracts was clear and unambiguous. In deciding 
facial ambiguity the Court must determine whether the alleged ambiguity is 
reasonably supported by the language of the contract. The term"GT40" in the 
Contracts is clear and unambiguous: it defines precisely what Watkins desired to 
purchase from Henry Day Ford. Extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to create 
9 
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an ambiguity in the contract when the term "GT40" is clear and unambiguous. 
Accordingly, no facial ambiguity exists and the trial court was correct in determining 
that the Contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the term of "GT40" and the 
parties' intent. Contrary to Watkins' allegation, the term"GT40" in the Contracts was 
not ambiguous. 
The Contracts demonstrate that there was a meeting of the minds as to their 
terms. Watkins went to Henry Day Ford to purchase a GT40. Watkins was explicit 
in what he wanted to purchase -- Ford GT40's. The Contracts reference on three (3) 
separate occasions within the Contract that Watkins was obligated to purchase, and 
Henry Day Ford was obligated to sell to Watkins, Ford GT40's and no other vehicle. 
The integration clause demonstrates that the Contract was a final expression 
of the parties' intentions. In this case, the Contracts contain an integration clause. 
Integration clauses, such as the one contained in the Contracts, are routinely 
incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the courts that the parties agree that 
the contract is to be considered completely integrated. A completely integrated 
agreement must be interpreted on its face, and thus the purpose and effect of including 
a merger is to preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets the 
document. 
The evidence and testimony clearly established Watkins' waiver of his 
contractual rights, if any, and/or his abandonment of the Contracts. Watkins, as an 
10 
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experienced automobile dealer, knew his rights under the Contracts, and clearly 
demonstrated his intention to relinquish those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00 
check. Watkins' conduct, cashing the check, and his silence, not contacting Henry 
Day Ford until June 2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes a 
waiver of the Contracts. Henry Day Ford's return of Watkins' deposit and Watkins' 
acceptance of the deposit and subsequent failure to contact Henry Day Ford regarding 
his continued desire to purchase a Ford GT 40, demonstrate that both parties 
abandoned the Contracts. 
Watkins failed to mitigate his damages when he refused Henry Day Ford's 
offer to sell Watkins a Ford GT for MSRP. Watkins was offered the vehicle that he 
indicated he wanted to purchase for MSRP. Watkins declined to purchase the vehicle 
and thereby, effectively, failed to mitigate his damages. 
Henry Day Ford is entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs. Pursuant 
to the Contracts, Henry Day Ford was entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and 
costs. The award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court is supported by the 
Contracts. 
l l 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
CONTRACTS ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
AND WERE INTENDED TO BE A FINAL AND 
COMPLETE EXPRESSION OF THE PARTIES' 
BARGAIN IS SUPPORTED BY RECENT COURT 
DECISIONS. 
Each and every Contract at issue in this case is clear and unambiguous. It is 
undisputed that the Contracts are standard forms, with which both parties were exceedingly 
familiar. The law applicable where a contract is clear and intended to be a final expression 
of the parties' bargain is clear; 
In interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself to 
ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each 
contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. 
If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract 
maybe interpreted as a matter of law.... 
An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies. 
WebEank v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, ffifl 8-20,54 P.3d 1139, 
citing Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.. 2002 UT 43, fl9, 48 P.3d 918. 
In this case, we do not confront unclear language or omitted language, but rather 
Watkins' claim to alternate "plausible" interpretation. Cases that have required testing for 
the presence of contract ambiguity have, not surprisingly, avoided an etymologically-based 
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test of plausibility. Rather, courts have been content to permit plausibility to speak for itself. 
For example, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the proffered alternate interpretation "must 
be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used," (First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc.. 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998)), and that to merit consideration as an 
interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition "must be based upon the 
usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result of a forced or 
strained construction." (Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 367 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991)). Although this Court has left some discretion to courts in determining 
whether ambiguity exists, at a minimum one universal standard applies to this determination: 
words and phrases do not qualify as ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow 
them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests. Alf v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 1993). 
When determining whether a contract provision is ambiguous, the parties may look 
to evidence beyond the language of the contract. But" '[t]he only evidence relevant to that 
inquiry is evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the [agreement].' 
" Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, If 19,48 P.3d 918 (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Yeargin. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, If 39, 20 P.3d 287.) 
A. The Contracts. 
Henry Day Ford submits that the Contracts executed by the parties are undisputedly 
clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a final and complete expression of the 
parties' bargain. The Contracts specifically provided that Watkins requested to purchase 
"GT40s" (Findings of Facts ffif 2,3 and 4, a copy of which is attached hereto at Appendix 3.) 
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and Henry Day Ford agreed to sell to Watkins two (2) Ford GT40's. (Findings of Fact 
f 10; Appendices 1-3.) 
Notwithstanding the undisputed facts, Watkins proposes "The Trial Court erred in 
concluding the contracts were a clear and unambiguous expression of the parties' intent". 
(Watkins' Brief, p. 'i'.) The trial court's decision, however, is supported by the clear and 
unambiguous Contracts at issue in this case. 
The Appellate Courts of this State have addressed the principles to be used by trial 
courts in interpreting a written contract in no less than six (6) cases in the past year. In each 
of these cases, it has been held that a "court first looks to the contract's four corners to 
determine the parties' intentions"2 The most recent case on this subject, South Ridge 
2
 See: Bichlver v. DEI Systems. 2009 UT 63 (Sept. 29, 2009, Case No. 20061162). 
We use the principles of contract interpretation to interpret the terms of the Lease 
and the Purchase Agreement. "The underlying purpose in construing or 
interpreting contractual provisions is to determine the intentions of the parties." 
IHCHealth Servs. v. D &KMgmL, 2008 UT 73, f 44, 196 P.3d 588 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Absent ambiguity, we look only "to the language of the 
contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties." Cafe 
Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford- Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, f 25, 207 P.3d 1235. 
Red Cliffs Corner v. J.J. Hunan. 2009 UT App 240 (Utah App. 9/3/2009), 2009 UT App 240 
(Utah App., 2009). 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four corners to 
determine the parties intentions, which are controlling. If the language within the 
four corners of the contract is unambiguous . . . a court determines the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law. 
Encon Utah. LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC. 2009 UT 7, 210 P.3d 263 (Utah, 2009). 
Where the language within the four corners of a contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. 
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Homeowners Association v. Brown. Case No. 200800836-CA, Filed February 4, 2010, is 
directly on point In South Ridge the Court of Appeals held: 
Accordingly, our interpretation of the relevant provisions is 
limited to the four corners of the CC&Rs, and we of course 
interpret the relevant language in light of the overall meaning 
and intent of the CC&Rs. SeeBodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins. 
2009 UT 52, f 19, 215 P.3d 933 ("When we interpret a 
contract,... we determine the intent of the contracting parties 
by first look[ing] to the writing alone. If the writing is 
unambiguous, we determine the intent of the parties 
exclusively from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language.") (alteration in original) (citation footnotes and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Peterson & Simpson v. 
IHC Health Servs.Jnc. 2009 UT 54413.217 P.3d 716 r As 
with any contract, we determine what the parties have agreed 
upon by looking first to the plain language within the four 
corners of the document. When interpreting the plain 
language, 'we look for a reading that harmonizes the 
provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless.' 
If we find the language unambiguous, we interpret the 
contract as a matter of law.") (citations omitted). See also 
Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 16, f 11, 998 P.2d 
Innerlight. Inc. v. Matrix Group. LLC. 2009 UT 31 (Utah 6/5/2009), 2009 UT 31 (Utah, 2009) 
When interpreting a contract, we begin by looking within the four corners of the 
contract "to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. Bakowski 
v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62,116,52 P.3d 1179 (citations omitted). 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous,... A 
court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language as a matter of law." Id. Innerlight and Matrix entered into an 
agreement that was negotiated and signed by both parties. We find that there is 
no ambiguity in the relevant provisions of the Contract and therefore look to the 
plain meaning of the contractual terms to determine the parties' intent. 
Free Motion Fitness. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank West 208 P.3d 209 UT App 120 (Utah 
App, 2009) 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four corners to 
determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the language within 
the four corners of the contract is unambiguous... a court determines the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language. 
15 
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807("Restrictive covenants that run with the land and 
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between 
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot 
owners; therefore, interpretation of the covenants is governed 
by the same rules of construction as those used to interpret 
contracts."). "In interpreting contracts, 'the ordinary and usual 
meaning of the words used is given effect,'" which "ordinary 
meaning . . . is often best determined through standard, non-
legal dictionaries." Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & 
LoanAss'n. 899 P.2d 779,782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, as in South Ridge, the relevant provisions of the Contracts are not 
ambiguous. The fact that the parties may have different views about the meaning of the key 
terms does not render the terms ambiguous. A contract term is not ambiguous simply 
because one party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own interests. (See, 
Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross. 845 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.), es t denied. 
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The Contracts at issue in this case are undisputedly clear. Watkins negotiated and 
signed two (2) Contracts, which he acknowledged to be correct, to purchase two (2) Ford 
GT40's from Henry Day Ford. Watkins, however, proposes that the Contracts do not state 
what they state and proposes that since Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT40 to 
the Ford GT that he should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from Henry Day Ford. 
This agreement fails, as the trial court held, based upon the testimony and evidence presented 
at trial, 
The trial court found that Watkins "has been an owner of one or more motor vehicle 
dealerships since 1989 and has been involved in the retail automobile business in various 
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capacities since 1968." (Findings of Fact ^[1; Appendix 3.) Watkins went to Henry Day 
Ford specifically to purchase one or more Ford GT40's. The Trial Court found: 
It was undisputed that Plaintiff specifically requested that the 
Defendant sell him Ford GT 40 automobiles and Plaintiffs 
request was specifically referenced in the Contracts which 
were executed by the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
(Findings of Fact %l 1; Tr.70:5-13; Appendix 3.) 
If Watkins would have intended to by any other vehicle, he could have so requested 
that in the Contracts. Watkins did not and, as such, his appeal should be dismissed as a 
matter of law based upon the Contracts. 
Second, Watkins asserts that "Ford put the car it had presented in 2002 at the Detroit 
Auto Show into production in 2004 as the "Ford GT Coupe". (Watkins' Brief, pg. 8 .) 
Watkins asserted that the name of the car was changed by Ford as early as 2003 (Trial 
Exhibit 12), yet Watkins failed to request that the Contracts be amended. It is important to 
note that Watkins, after he executed the Contracts, requested Henry Day Ford modify the 
Contracts to include 'MSRP' as the purchased price. (See Tr. 50:5-25, 51:1-6.) However, 
at no time did Watkins request that the Contracts be modified to reflect any vehicle other 
than a Ford GT40. Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and said, "I 
don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy a Ford GT." 
The contract should be changed"? 
A. No. 
(See Findings of Fact f22; Appendix 3; Trial Transcript at 71:17-20). 
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Third, Watkins acknowledged that Ford built GT40's (Tr. 38:25, 39:1-2) and that 
Ford could build a Ford GT40 in the future. (See Tr. 74:22-24.) It is also undisputed that 
Henry Day Ford has never had, to the time of trial, a Ford GT40. 
Henry Day Ford submits that the Contracts executed by the parties are clear and 
unambiguous and were intended to be a final and complete expression of the parties' intent. 
The Contracts specifically provided that Watkins contracted to purchase two (2) Ford 
GT40's. The Contracts in this case represented what Watkins, an experienced automobile 
dealer, requested. Even if the name of the vehicle changed, as alleged by Watkins, he did 
not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a different model, though Watkins knew 
he had the right to make, and that he had in the past made, such a request. 
The trial court concluded: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based 
upon the plain meaning contained in the Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff 
a "Ford GT 40". 
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, 
defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, 
plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law f^l[3, 4, 5; Appendix 3.) 
In this case, the Contracts are undisputedly clear. Watkins asked to purchase two (2) 
GT40' s and, pursuant to Watkins' request, two (2) Contracts were prepared, read, and signed 
by Watkins. (Tr. 120:1-3.) The Contracts represented the parties' bargain in every respect. 
Watkins, however, proposes the Contracts do not state what they state and proposes 
that since Ford may have changed the designation of the Ford GT40 to the Ford GT that he 
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should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from Henry Day Ford. This argument fails, 
as the trial court held, for a number of reasons including Watkins's own testimony: 
It was undisputed that Plaintiff specifically requested that the 
Defendant sell him Ford GT 40 automobiles and Plaintiffs 
request was specifically referenced in the Contracts which 
were executed by the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
(Findings of Fact |11 ; Appendix 3; Tr. 70:5-13.) 
If Watkins would have intended to buy any other vehicle, he could have included that 
request in the Contracts. 
Watkins asserts the name of the car was changed but at no time did Watkins request 
that the Contracts be modified to reflect any vehicle other that a Ford GT40. (See Findings 
of Fact [^22; Appendix 3). Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and said, "I 
don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy a Ford GT." 
The contract should be changed"? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 71:17-20.) 
Watkins acknowledged that Ford had built a model GT40. (Tr. 38:25, 39:1-2.) 
Watkins also acknowledged that Ford could build a Ford GT40 in the future. (Tr. 74:22-24.) 
The Trial Court concluded from the testimony and evidence at trial: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based 
upon the plain meaning contained in the Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff 
a "Ford GT 40". 
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Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, 
defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, 
plaintiff s Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law ffl[3, 4, 5; Appendix 3.) 
(1) The Terms of the Contracts as a Matter of Law May Not 
be Altered or 'Explained' by the Parties, 
Watkins contends motor vehicles are "goods", and as such are governed by Article 
2 of Uniform Commercial Code. (Watkins Brief, p. 14). It is pertinent to note that this 
argument was not raised by Watkins at trial or was it part of Watkins' Complaint. Henry 
Day, however, does not dispute that motor vehicles are "goods", but submits that the Code 
Section relied on by Watkins,§70A-2-202, is not applicable. Section 70A-2-202 provides, 
in relevant part as follow: 
Terms....set forth in a writing intended by the parties as 
a final expression of their agreement with respect to such 
terms as are included may not be contradicted by evidence 
of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral 
agreement but may be explained or supplement: 
(1) By course of performance, course of dealing or usage 
of trade...or by course of performance; and 
(2) By evidence of consistent additional terms unless the 
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the 
agreement. (Emphasis added.) 
First, the Contracts at issue were undisputedly intended by the parties to be the final 
expression of their agreement. The Contracts each provided: 
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes all of 
the terms, conditions and warranties on both the face and 
reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and 
supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof 
comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
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of the agreement relating to the subject matter covered 
hereby. 
Second, there was no testimony or evidence cited by Watkins indicating a 'course of 
performance, dealing or usage of trade'. In fact, the only evidence of usage of trade was 
Watkins' acknowledgment of his familiarity with the Contracts and that he knew that it was 
important that the Contracts be prepared accurately and completely. (Tr. 69:17-19,76:1-3.) 
Third, Watkins proposes, at page 16 of his brief that the "Contract was not intended 
as a final expression of all terms; and certainly not the meaning to be ascribed to GT40". 
The plain meaning of the Contract is addressed above. Watkins further contends that the 
Contracts were not the parties' final agreement because the Contracts did not include a 
delivery date, model year or any other specific attributes of the vehicle. (Watkins Brief, p. 
16.) The parties' failure to include the referenced terms, however, does not allow the 
specific terms of the Contracts to be explained. 
Utah Code Ann. S70A-2-204 provides: 
Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for 
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have 
intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
The purpose of this subsection, as mentioned in the comments, Subsection (3) states 
the principle as to "open terms" underlying later sections of the Article. If the parties intend 
to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection recognizes that agreement as valid in law, 
despite missing terms, if there is any reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy. 
The test is not certainty as to what the parties were to do nor 
as to the exact amount of damages due the plaintiff. Nor is the 
fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough 
of itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. Rather, 
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commercial standards on the point of "indefiniteness" are 
intended to be applied, this Act making provision elsewhere 
for missing terms needed for performance, open price, 
remedies and the like. 
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement 
is essential to the formation of a contract." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 
373 (Utah 1996). Thus, a binding contract exists where it can be shown that the parties had 
a meeting of the minds as to the "integral features of [the] agreement" and that the terms are 
sufficiently definite as to be capable of being enforced. Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26 94 P.3d 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case the only 
meeting of the parties' minds was Watkins agreeing to purchase, and Henry Day Ford 
agreeing to sell, GT40's 
Watkins and Henry Day Ford were free to leave open terms in the contract, and the 
conduct by both parties recognizing the existence of the Contracts is sufficient to establish 
a contract for sale. 
The Contracts are standard forms that have been used in this State for many years, 
and with which Watkins was very familiar as an automobile dealer. Watkins never 
demonstrated how the language of the Contracts was ambiguous, but only that they were 
ambiguous when applied to the circumstances of this case. 
It is undisputed that the parties' Contracts were fully integrated. Therefore, the parties' 
subjective "intent" could not be the proper subject of the trial court's analysis. (See WebBank 
v. American General Annuity Service Corp.. 2002 UT 88, ^ 2 1 , 26-26, 54 P.3d 1139.) At 
the time the contract was made/entered into, the intent of the parties was the purchase of a 
Ford GT40 made to the exact specifications presented at the auto show by Watkins. It is 
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undisputed that Watkins wanted to purchase a Ford GT40. In fact, when Henry Day Ford 
later offered to sell Watkins a Ford GT, Watkins refused. 
(2) Extrinsic Evidence Cannot Be Used When the Four 
Corners of the Contract Do Not Contain a Facial 
Ambiguity, 
Watkins asserts that the trial court erred in determining that the GT40 language is 
unambiguous. Whether a contractual term or provision is ambiguous is a question of law. 
See Daines v. Vincent. 2008 UT 51,125.190P.3d 1269. Once the court determines that the 
term or provision of a contract is facially ambiguous, it may determine the parties' intent 
through examination of parol evidence, the determination of which presents a question of 
fact. "In reviewing a trial court's contract interpretation, the court of appeals defers to the trial 
court's questions of fact but not on questions of law." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.,2002 UT 
43,114,48P.3d918. 
The trial court concluded from the evidence and testimony presented that the 
language in the Contracts was clear and unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court most 
recently addressed this subject in Cafe Rio. Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton. LLC, 2009 UT 
6, 622 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. In Cafe Rio, there was a dispute among the owners of six 
contiguous parcels of property in a commercial development regarding the meaning of two 
contracts. The trial court held that the contracts were not ambiguous and prohibited Larkin-
Gifford-Overton (LGO) from constructing a building on property it owned that was subject 
to cross-easements. On appeal, the Supreme Court set forth the guiding principles for 
contract interpretation, including how to determine if ambiguity exists in a contract and when 
parol evidence of intent may be considered. The court in Cafe Rio held: 
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Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look 
to the language of the contract to determine its meaning and 
the intent of the contracting parties. We also consider each 
contract provision.. .in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Where the 
language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract 
may be interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the language of 
the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence 
of the parties' intent. We have explained that ambiguity exists 
in a contract term or provision if it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings 
of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. 
Cafe_Rioatf25. 
The contract at issue in Cafe Rio defined common areas as "expressly excluding all 
buildings (and any building(s) constructed on [LGO's parcels] in the future)." The Supreme 
Court concluded that this language was not ambiguous and LGO, therefore, had a right to 
construct a building on its parcel upon otherwise-common area. 
Cafe Rio was preceded by Daines v. Vincent 2008 UT 51.190 P.3d 1269. In Daines. 
the court identified two contexts in which contractual ambiguity may occur: "(1) facial 
ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the 
intent of the contracting parties." Daines at 1J24. In addressing facial ambiguity, the Daines 
court found: 
In Ward [Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1995)] we set forth a two-part standard for determining 
facial ambiguity. First, we indicated that "[w]hen determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must 
be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is 
inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 
' extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience."1 Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Second, after a judge considers relevant and 
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credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must 
ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract." Ward, 907 P.2d at 
268. 
In articulating the Ward rule, we sought to establish a 
balanced, "better-reasoned" approach to an analysis of facial 
ambiguity that would aliow judges to "consider the writing in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances." Id, However, we 
did not intend that a judge allow surrounding circumstances 
to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would 
not otherwise permit. In other words, our statement that 
"[rjational interpretation requires at least a preliminary 
consideration of all credible evidence," id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted), does not create a preference for that evidence 
over the language of the contract. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. 
ExcL, 2006 UT 20, f 17, 133 P.3d 428 (stating that 
alternative interpretations of contractual language must be 
supported by the usual and natural meaning of the language 
used). Thus, under Ward, a finding of ambiguity after a 
review of relevant, extrinsic evidence is appropriate only 
when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." 
0W,9O7P.2dat268. 
Daines at Tffl26-27. 
In other words, extrinsic evidence proffered to show the existence of ambiguity 
would not trump "the language of the contract." A court may not consider parol evidence 
of intent without first finding ambiguity in the language of a contract. And, while relevant 
evidence proffered to demonstrate the alleged facial ambiguity must be considered, this 
Court's analysis of such evidence is strictly limited to the determination of the existence of 
facial ambiguity and is "ultimately circumscribed by the language of the agreement." See 
Daines at 1269. 
In the present case, the first step must be to determine if the contracts are facially 
ambiguous, i.e., whether the contract language is "susceptible to contrary, tenable 
interpretations." Instead, Watkins wants to allow extrinsic evidence demonstrating the 
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alleged ambiguity. Although many Utah cases have stated that the parties' intent is 
paramount, admission of parol evidence to determine intent is allowed only if there is a 
finding of facial ambiguity. In deciding facial ambiguity the Court must determine whether 
the alleged ambiguity is reasonably supported by the language of the contract. The 
termuGT40" in the Contracts is clear and unambiguous: it defines precisely what Watkins 
desired to purchase from Henry Day Ford. 
In this case, the Contracts specifically provided that Watkins contracted to purchase 
two (2) Ford GT 40's. The Contracts in this case represented what Watkins, an experienced 
automobile dealer, requested. Even if the name of the vehicle changed, as alleged by the 
Watkins, he did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a different model, 
though Watkins knew he had the right to make such a request. 
The Trial Court Concluded: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based 
upon the plain meaning contained in the Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff 
a "Ford GT 40". 
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, 
defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, 
plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law ff3, 4, 5; Appendix 3.) 
Watkins, however, proposes the Contracts do not state what they state and proposes 
that since Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT40 to the Ford GT that he should have 
been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from Henry Day Ford. This argument fails, as the Trial 
Court held, for a number of reasons including Watkins5 s own testimony that he specifically 
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requested that Henry Day Ford sell him Ford GT 40 automobiles and Watkins' request was 
specifically referenced in the Contracts. (Findings of Fact ^[11; Appendix 3; Tr.70:5-13.) 
If Watkins would have intended to by any other vehicle, he could have so requested that in 
the Contracts. 
Second, Watkins asserts the name of the car was changed, but at no time did Watkins 
request that the Contracts be modified to reflect any vehicle other that a Ford GT40. (See 
Findings of Fact T|22; Appendix 3.) Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and said, "I 
don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy a Ford GT." 
The contract should be changed"? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 71:17-20.) 
Third, Watkins acknowledged that Ford had previously manufactured a model GT40. 
(Tr. 38:25,39:1-2.) Watkins also acknowledged that Ford could manufacture a Ford GT40 
in the future. (Tr. 74:22-24.) 
The Trial Court concluded from the testimony and evidence at trial: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based 
upon the plain meaning contained in the Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff 
a "Ford GT 40". 
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, 
defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, 
plaintiff s Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law fflf3, 4, 5; Appendix 3.) 
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Watkins should not be allowed to raise an amibuguity by extrinsic evidence that was 
not discussed within the four corners of the Contracts when no facial ambiguity exists. Only 
if the language of a contract is ambiguous will extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent be 
allowed. Watkins should not be allowed to create an ambiguity in the Contracts when the 
clear and unambiguous language will not allow him. Accordingly, the extrinsic evidence 
should not be allowed to create an ambiguity in the contract when the term "GT40" is clear 
and unambiguous. Accordingly, no facial ambiguity exists and the trial court was correct in 
determining that the Contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the term of "GT40" and the 
parties'intent. 
(3) Contrary to Watkins' Allegation the Term "GT40" in the 
Contracts was not Ambiguous. 
In this section of Watkins' argument he begins with the question "What is a Ford 
"GT40"?" Watkins answered this question in his testimony at trial and throughout his Brief, 
including: 
a. At page 5 of Watkins'brief he states: "Watkins inquired 
if Henry Day Ford might be allocated any Ford GT40s and, 
if yes, would it sell him one? [Transcript Citation omitted]. 
b. The Contracts only reference the sale of GT40's (in at 
least three locations); Watkins read the Contracts after they 
were prepared. (Tr. 120:1-3.); Watkins offered to put a 
deposit $1,000.00 on the Ford GT40s that he wanted to 
purchase from Henry Day Ford and which the Contacts 
referenced (Tr. 77:13-14.); and, each of the Contracts 
reference a "Cash Down Payment" of $1,000.00 for the 
GT40s. (See Trial Exhibits 1-4). 
c. Ford had built and could build at anytime in the future a 
Ford GT40, has it had done with the Ford Shelby. (Tr. 74:15-
24.) 
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Interestingly, Watkins states "... .Ford subsequent to January 2002, did not deliver to 
its dealers models designated expressly as GT40s." (Watkins' Brief, p. 20) Watkins, 
however, cites no authority for this statement. 
In the next paragraph, Watkins states: "Henry Day Ford at trial, though, did not offer 
any explanation (at least not when being examined by its own counsel), as to what it 
understood "GT40" to mean in March 2002 when it wrote up Contracts that used that term." 
First it should be noted that Watkins, as the plaintiff, was responsible to present evidence 
and/or testimony to support his case. Second this subject was addressed in the record and 
included Mr. Kersey's testimony. At the time the Contracts were prepared, Henry Day Ford 
did not know whether it would be allocated a Ford GT40. (Tr. 111:10-13.) Steve Kersey 
also testified that he did not know anything about the production or allocation of the Ford 
GT40 prior to meeting with Watkins. (Tr. 115:3-5.) 
Watkins, at page 21 of his brief, states "Henry Day Ford, at trial, presented no 
evidence that the Ford "GTs" that it later received were a vehicle and model other than that 
which Ford in early 2002 introduced as the GT40 at the North American Auto Show, 
announced would be put in to production, and which it later made available to its dealers as 
the Ford "GT." First, as noted in the facts above, testimony regarding the North American 
Auto Show and the Ford GT40 was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. 
(Tr.40:4-10). Second, again it was Watkins as the plaintiff who had the duty to establish the 
allegations and claims brought in his Complaint. Third, Trial Exhibit 12 at no place 
specifically states that the "Ford GT40" was 'renamed' the "Ford GT". In fact, the names 
seem to be used interchangeably. Fourth, Jeremy Day testified that the Ford GT had several 
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names including Heritage. (Tr. 138:1-2.) Fifth, Watkins presented no evidence of a name 
change other than the unsupported hearsay contained in Trial Exhibit 12. Finally, if the name 
had changed as early as Exhibit 12 indicates, which was 2003, why didn't Watkins request 
the Contracts be modified as he had when he requested the inclusion of MSRP for the sales 
price? 
Also at page 21 of Watkins' Brief he states: 
First and perhaps of greater significance in determining the 
meaning that Henry Day Ford ascribed to "GT40" when it 
prepared the contracts, is Steve Kersey's testimony. Kersey 
testified that he understood the Ford GT was the same vehicle 
that he, in preparing the contracts, had referred to as the Ford 
GT. 
Q. [by Watkins' attorney]: Now you understand that the 
automobiles that were the subject of these contracts was the 
yet to be produced Ford GT concept car or the GT40 as it was 
called at that time, correct? 
A. [Kersey]: Yes. 
How could Mr. Kersey understand that the 'automobiles that were the subject of [the] 
contracts was the yet to be produced Ford GT"? How can anyone know what is unknown? 
Mr. Kersey understood that Watkins requested to buy Ford GT40's. (Tr. 115:3-4.) Mr. 
Kersey prepared the Contracts as requested by Watkins. 
At page 22 of his Brief, Watkins' asserts: 
Jeremy Day, a co-owner and general manager of Henry Day 
Ford, reluctantly conceded that the Ford GT was the same 
vehicle that Ford Motor Company had initially introduced as 
the Ford GT 40: 
Q. [by Watkins' attorney]: As of the date of that letter, 
December 31, you knew that dealers winning those awards 
would qualify for cars. 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. [Day]: What I knew is that's what our zone rep had told 
me, yes. It was - it was - 1 would not receive a GT40, but 
if we won one of those two awards, we could receive the 
GT. 
Q. The GT had earlier been introduced as the GT40, had it 
not? 
A. I'm not sure. I mean - 1 didn't - 1 didn't watch the trade 
shows or whatnot. I believe so. I think evidence says that it 
was, yes. 
(Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted.) 
Mr. Day clearly did not 'concede' that the Ford GT was the same as the GT40, 
contrary to Watkins' allegation. 
At page 23 Watkins states "The 'clincher', though, is Defendant's Trail Exhibit 12 
which indicates unequivocally that the Ford GT40 and the Ford GT are the same vehicle". 
The testimony at trial was, as noted above, that the vehicles are not the same. Exhibit 12 was 
found to be hearsay and was not supported by any other creditable evidence. Watkins then 
submits with his Brief Addendums "E", "F" and "G". None of these articles was introduced 
a trial, and certainly not admitted into evidence, and therefore may not be considered. As 
noted above, this Court will not review evidence that was not presented to the district court 
and must disregard any newly presented materials improperly included in a party's brief. See 
Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99, If 16, 17 P.3d 1110; Utah R. App. P. 11(a); 
and Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, f 14 n. 5,128 P.3d 1123. 
At the bottom of page 23 of Watkins' brief he states: "The vehicle model that 
Watkins desired to buy, when it later became available to the public, was the vehicle that 
Ford Motor Co. had recently introduced at the Detroit Auto Show as the 'GT40'". The 
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problem with this statement is two fold. First, as noted above, though he alleged a name 
change as early as 2003, Watkins never asked to modify the Contracts to reflect this 'new 
name'. Second, Watkins had already accepted his deposit back without objection. (Tr. 80:7-
9.) Watkins testified the deposit was made by Watkins to "secure the deal" (Tr. 77:21-24.), 
the $1,000.00 deposit was part of the Contract (Tr. 78:23-25), and the Contracts would not 
have been written by Watkins without the deposit. (Tr. 79:15-19.) 
Watkins correctly states "For a contract to be formed there must "be a meeting of the 
minds of the parities, which must be spelled out either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient 
defmiteness to be enforced". (Watkins Brief, p.24.) The Contracts demonstrate that there 
was a meeting of the minds as to their terms. Watkins went to Henry Day Ford to purchase 
a GT40. Watkins' exact testimony was that he went to Henry Day Ford "to see if I could 
speak with some about Ford GT40s". Watkins was explicit in what he wanted to purchase ~ 
Ford GT40's. The testimony of Watkins and Mr. Kersey, the Henry Day Ford sales person 
that Watkins met with, then varies in the sequence of events, but Mr. Kersey testified: 
Q. Do you recall what was said in that first meeting [with 
Watkins], sir? 
A. My - to the best of my recollection he explained to me 
that he wanted to purchase two GT40s. And I told him at that 
time that I did not know anything about them." 
Q. Was Mr. Watkins specific about the vehicle he wanted to 
buy?" 
A. He was. 
(Tr. 115:1-8.) 
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The Contracts were then prepared by Mr. Kersey and Watkins who, as noted above, 
is experienced with the preparation of the subject Contracts. The Contracts reference on 
three (3) separate occasions within the Contract that Watkins was obligated to purchase, and 
Henry Day Ford was obligated to sell to Watkins, Ford GT40's and no other vehicle. It was 
undisputed that Ford had manufactured GT40's in the past and Watkins acknowledged that 
Ford could manufacture a Ford GT40 in the future. As noted above, Watkins swore in his 
Affidavit submitted at trial, and then attempted to explain away his sworn testimony, that he 
had seen a red GT40 at Butterfield Ford. (Tr. 72:21-25; 73:17-20.) Finally, on this subject 
Watkins did not present any testimony to the effect that Ford had not manufactured a GT40 
model vehicle in the years subsequent to the execution of the Contracts. 
The Contracts were for GT40s and represented the parties 'meeting of mind' on the 
subject. Watkins next argues at page 25 of his Brief that "the term "GT40.... includes the 
vehicle/model that Ford [purportedly] renamed the "GT" in the course of production and 
later made available to dealers." First, Watkins failed to provide any evidence of what 
model, GT40 or GT, Ford 'made available to dealers'. No other dealer or other dealer 
records were introduced at trial on this subject. Watkins only submitted evidence of Ford 
GTs that were sold at auctions, but not by dealers. Second, Watkins suggests his argument 
for the meaning of what the Contracts 'should' mean is a "plausible interpretations of the 
parties use in 2002 of the term 'GT40'", (Watkins Brief, p.25.) Clearly if a 'plausible 
interpretation' is at issue to decide the parties meeting of minds then there was no meeting 
of the minds which Watkins, as noted above, acknowledges is necessary to enforce a 
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contract. Watkins' argument seems to suggest that there was no enforceable Contracts in this 
case. 
(4) The Integration Clause Demonstrates That The Contract Was A 
Final Expression of the Parties'Intent. 
In Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren. 2008 UT 20,182 P.3d 326a the Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated that "[w]hether a contract is integrated is a question of fact reviewed for 
clear error." Notwithstanding that standard of review, the Tangren court noted that extrinsic 
evidence would be allowed on the issue of integration, despite "a clear integration clause, 
where the contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or 
where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality." The Tangren court 
further disavowed prior cases that may have allowed extrinsic evidence outside the 
enumerated types of allegations, holding that "we will not allow extrinsic evidence of a 
separate agreement to be considered on the question of integration in the face of a clear 
integration clause." 
In the present case, Watkins does not allege forgery, a joke, a sham, lack of 
consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality. 
Therefore, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed because the Contracts contain a clear 
integration clause. Clearly the evidence and testimony supports the fact that the Contracts 
were intended by both parties as a final expression of all terms contained therein. 
In this case, the Contracts contain an integration clause: 
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes all of 
the terms, conditions and warranties on both the face and 
reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and 
supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof 
comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
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of the agreement relating to the subject matter covered 
hereby. 
Henry Day Ford and Watkins explicitly agree that the Contracts contain the entire 
understanding between the parties with respect to its subject-matter. Integration clauses, 
such as this one, are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the courts that 
the parties agree that the contract is to be considered completely integrated. A completely 
integrated agreement must be interpreted on its face, and thus the purpose and effect of 
including a merger is to preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets the document. 
Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc.,2004 UT 70, If 28,98 P.3d 15 (quoting Sec. Watch, 
Inc. v. Sentinel Svs.. Inc. J76 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.1999)). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED WATKINS* WAIVER OF HIS 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS, IF ANY, AND/OR HIS 
ABANDONMENT OF THE CONTRACTS 
Watkins states at page 3 0 of his Brief that he "especially challenges the Court Finding 
numbered 28, 40, 41 and 42. Henry Day Ford submits, and will demonstrate below, these 
findings are undisputedly supported by the testimony and evidence at trial." 
A. Waiver/Abandonment of the Contract Rights. 
Watkins relies on the case of Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 857 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) in support of its argument that a "distinct intent to waive must. . . be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence". (Watkins' Brief pg. 31.) 
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The only part of Soter's on which Watkins relies is footnote 6 of the Supreme Court's 
opinion. Watkins has not accurately stated the holding in Soter's. The Supreme Court held 
in Soter's: 
On this basis, we hold that there is only one legal standard 
required to establish waiver under Utah law. We conclude 
that Phoenix properly stated the requirements for waiver: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it. 
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be 
distinct. Under this legal standard, a fact finder need only 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances "warrants 
the inference of relinquishment." Such a flexible approach is 
particularly important because waiver is a term which has 
various meanings depending on the facts and the context in 
which it is used. 92 C.J.S. 
Soter's at 942 (internal citations omitted.). 
Contrary to Watkins' allegation, it is not necessary to readdress the holding in 
Soter's3. Also contrary to the allegation of Watkins, this Court has addressed the burden of 
persuasion to establish the defense of waiver. 
In September 2009, this Court in Red Cliffs Corner v. J J. Hunan, 2009 UT App 240 
(Utah App. 9/3/2009), 2009 UT App 240 f 15 (Utah App., 2009) cited Kenny v. Rich. 2008 
UT App 209, Ifl 8, 186 P.3d 989: 
3
 Soters was referred to the Utah Supreme Court from the United States Federal Court 
for a clear definition of waiver in Utah. Counsel for Henry Day Ford represented Tri-
K Contractors, who asserted the waiver argument, in Soter's. During oral argument 
Justice Zimmerman stated, in effect, with regard to the elements of waiver "It appears 
that we have over cooked this issue". Here, Watkins is attempting to create the same 
path that it took Soter's to clarify. 
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Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed question 
of law and fact. [W]hether the trial court employed the proper 
standard of waiver presents a legal question which is 
reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly 
supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be 
reviewed as factual determinations. Thus, we grant broadened 
discretion to the trial court's findings when reviewing 
questions of waiver. 
The Red Cliffs Corner case continued at f33: 
Hunan argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that 
Hunan waived its breach of lease claim against RCC. "[A] 
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
IHC Health Servs.. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt.. Inc.. 2008 UT 73, 
If 16,196 P.3d 588. The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an 
existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent 
to relinquish the right." IdL Hunan does not argue the first two 
elements of waiver. 
In this case, the elements of waiver were established by the undisputed evidence. The 
Trial Court found: 
Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced automobile 
dealer and as such would be very familiar with industry 
practices, he negotiated the return of his deposit without 
objection or reservation of any type. Based upon plaintiffs 
experience, in the auto dealership industry, plaintiffs claim 
that he deposited the check because he did not know what to 
do with the check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt 
whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had with the 
letter and the check, nor made any attempts within a 
reasonable time of receiving the letter and check to assert or 
enforce his contract rights. 
Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without reservation, 
objection, or condition, unequivocally demonstrated his 
abandonment of the Contracts. 
Plaintiff s demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant 
over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted a return of his 
deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that defendant 
returned plaintiffs check in good faith and based upon the 
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reasonable belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's. 
Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his 
intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the subject vehicles 
from defendant. 
(Findings of Fact ffl|28, 40, 41, 42; Appendix 3.) 
Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check? 
A. No. 




Undisputedly, Watkins, as an experienced automobile dealer, knew his rights under 
the Contracts, and clearly demonstrated his intention to relinquish those rights when he 
negotiated the $2,000.00 check. Waiver may be implied from conduct or silence. Soter's 
at 940. In this case, Watkins' conduct, cashing the check, and his silence, not contacting 
Henry Day Ford until June 2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes a 
waiver of the Contracts. 
In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67,73 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
[M]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or 
obligation to speak. It is generally accepted that a duty to 
speak will not be found where the contracting parties' deal at 
arm's length and where the underlying facts are reasonably 
within the knowledge of both parties. Under such 
circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable steps 
to inform himself and to protect his own interest. 
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In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Flake v. Flake. 71 P.2d 589 (Utah 2003) 
the Court held: 
Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to a contract 
intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its contractual 
rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party 
or parties to the contract. 
Watkins did nothing to protect his own interest. Watkins' silence by not contacting 
Henry Day Ford upon receipt of the $2,000.00 check or at any other time prior to June 2005 
also demonstrated Watkins' waiver of his rights under the Contracts. Clearly, Watkins' 
actions were inconsistent with the Contracts and Watkins' later demand on Henry Day Ford 
that it honor the Contracts prejudiced Henry Day Ford. 
Henry Day Ford's return of Watkins' deposit and Watkins' acceptance of the deposit 
and subsequent failure to contact Henry Day Ford regarding his continued desire to purchase 
a Ford GT 40, demonstrate that both parties abandoned the Contracts. "Abandonment", as 
stated in Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App. 243 1J25 166 P.3d 639 (Utah App. 2007), 
also requires: 
[t]he intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; 
and in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and 
unequivocal showing of such abandonment. An intent to 
abandon may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the 
parties, or from the attendant circumstances. (Citations 
omitted). 
Watkins waived his rights under the Contracts by his acts (receipt and negotiation of 
the $2,000.00 check) and his silence (failure to contact Henry Day Ford with regard to his 
continued desire to purchase a Ford GT 40). These same actions also demonstrate that the 
parties intended to abandon the Contracts. 
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Clearly, Watkins knew his rights under the Contracts. Watkins demonstrated, by his 
conduct of cashing the check without reservation or comment, that he intended to waive his 
right under the Contracts. 
Upon receipt of his $2,000.00 deposit from Henry Day Ford, Watkins negotiated the 
check without objection or reservation. Henry Day Ford then had no further contact with 
Watkins for two and half years, until June 2005 when Watkins demanded to buy a Ford GT 
from Henry Day Ford even though Watkins and Henry Day Ford never had an agreement 
referencing a Ford GT. 
Watkins' acceptance of his deposit was inconsistent with the continued existence of 
the Contracts. Henry Day Ford, because of the lapse of time it held Watkins' deposit and 
Watkins' undisputed actions, demonstrated it had also abandoned the contracts. "A contract 
will be treated as abandoned when one party acts in a manner inconsistent with the existence 
of the contract... Mutual assent to abandon a contract may be inferred from the attendant 
circumstances and conduct of the parties." Harris v. IES Associates, Inc.. 2003 UT App 112 
(UTCA 2003). 
POINT III 
WATKINS FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES 
WHEN HE REFUSED HENRY DAY FORD'S OFFER 
TO SELL WATKINS A FORD GT FOR MSRP. 
The Trial Court found: 
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In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to 
plaintiff for MSRP the Ford GT which had been allocated to 
defendant. 
Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford GT. 
Plaintiffs refusal to purchase the Ford GT constitutes a 
failure of Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. 
(Findings of Fact fflf38, 39; Appendix 3.) 
At trial, the Watkins testified: 
Q. Were you offered a Ford GT from Henry S. Day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that, sir? 
A. I don't know. Sometime after this. 
Q. Was it in 2005? 
A. It could have been. I was offered it through my lawyers. 
And I don't remember the date. 
Q. Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the dealership, 
sir? 
A. I don't think it was shortly after, no. 
Q. Within a month or two months? 
A. I don't know when. 
Q. What was your answer to the offer to sell you a Ford GT, 
sir? 
A. I declined it. 
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As a general rule where a party might have avoided a particular item of damage by 
reasonable effort, without undue risk, expense, or humiliation, he may not recover for that 
item if he fails to make such an effort. (Restatement.2d §350.) The Restatement continues 
that "if a party fails to avoid his avoidable damages, he/she simply loses his ability to recover 
them". (Restatement. 2d §350, Comment b.) 
In Utah, damages awarded for breach of contract should place the non breaching party 
in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. However, the non breaching 
party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, and he may not, either by action or inaction, 
aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach. Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT 104, P31, 990 
P.2d 93 3. In order to satisfy the duty to mitigate damages, a non breaching party must make 
"reasonable efforts and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 P.2d 1212,1214 
(Utah 1987) (quotations and citations omitted); see Angelos v In. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (stating that mitigation of damages requires non 
breaching party to avoid damages by "reasonable means"). 
In this case, Watkins was offered the vehicle that he indicated he wanted to purchase 
for MSRP. Watkins declined to purchase the vehicle and thereby, effectively, failed to 
mitigate his damages. The finding by the Trial Court is supported by the undisputed facts 
and Watkins's appeal should be summarily dismissed. 
POINT IV 
HENRY DAY FORD IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The Contracts provided: 
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In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of 
the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement, 
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees, court 
costs, and collection fees. 
(Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
Utah Code Ann. f78B-5-826 provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Pursuant to the Contracts, Henry Day Ford was entitled to an award of its attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court is supported by the 
Contracts and Watkins's appeal should be summarily dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court concluded: 
The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended 
to be the final and complete expression of the parties' 
bargains. 
The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements. 
The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts. 
Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, 
plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
in an amount to be proven by Affidavit. 
(Conclusions of Law ^ 1 , 2, 9,11, 12; Appendix 3.) 
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The Trial Court's decisions were each supported by the evidence and the law. 
(A) Relief Sought 
Based upon the foregoing, Henry Day Ford requests this Court affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of Watkins' Complaint and award of attorney's fees and costs to Henry Day Ford. 
Henry Day Ford further requests that Henry Day Ford be awarded its attorney's fees and 
costs incurred on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February, 2010. 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney for Henry Day Ford 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) bound copies and one (1) electronic copy of 
Appellee's Brief to P. Bryan Fishburn, 4505 South Wasatch Blvd. #215, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84124, this 18th day of February, 2010. ,-• " —• 
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ELLcryucALfcttr 
JEAL #J 1%1 
|flC[ >R VEHICLE CONTRACT Oi J/U.E « 3 / 0 ^ 0 a 
TQM MflTKtNS 
DATE OF SALE 
HENRY DRY FORD INC 
3399 S REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
PURCHASER'S NAME 
2537 EAST 6800 SOUTH 
STREETADDRESS 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UT B4181 
"cTfY COUNTY STATE 
(801)278-1913 
Phaser and Co-Purchaser(s), if any, (hereafter referred to as "Purchaser") hereby agree to purchase the following vehlde from Seller/Dealer (hereafter referred to as "Seller), subject to 










V STEVE KERSEY 
PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE 
ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5) 
MFR. REBATE $ N/ft 
PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 









TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
GLANCE OWED O N TRADE-IN: 







G O O D 
UNTIL: 
A C C . #: 
^RRANTY A S T O B A L A N C E O W E D O N TRADED-IN VEHICLE: 
haser warrants that he/she has given Seller a true pay-off amount on any 
ile traded In, and that If It Is not correct and Is greater than the amount shown j 
e, Purchaser will pay the excess to Seller on demand. 
TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN* 
NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN (line 10 minus 11) 
DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit amt. line 8) 
TOTAL CREDITS 
SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
(total lines 12 & 13) 
SERVICE CONTRACT 
SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS 
TBADE ALLOWANCE (line 10) 
NET TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) fe 
(total lines 15-17) 
N/A! 
UTAHSALES/USETAX ON 'TAXABLE AMOUNT' 
jua 
LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES 
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
FEDERAL LUXURYTAX 
DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
rOTALOFALLITEMSABOVE" ' ' (lines 18,21-27) 
TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 




















THIS SECTION FOR S E L L E R ' S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-IN 
• Title (If not, explain): ; 




TAX AUTHORIZATION FOR PAYOFF 
NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS O F USED VEHICLES 
Hie information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this vehicle Is part of this contract. 
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract of sale. 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE. 
X 
FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION: One of the two following disclosures, either "A" or "B", must be acknowledged, if 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing, or if this Is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-ln only 
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A". If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then both 
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "B", BY SIGNING, PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE 
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO. IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE " B " , DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL B U N K S HAVE BEEN FILLED IN. 
PURCHASER A G R E E S TO A R R A N G E FINANCING 
"(A)" THE PURCHASER O F T H E MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL-
EDGES THAT THE SELLER OFTHE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES, WARRANTIES, 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLER'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE 
PURCHASE OFTHE MOTOR VEHICLE. FURTHERMORE, PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT fF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON-
SiBILTY OF THE PURCHASER. 
S1QNATURE 
OF PURCHASER 
S E L L E R A G R E E S TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(B)" T H E PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN N/ft/0 AND _ 
N/ft MONTHS AND 
JUZflPER MONTH AND$_ 
Ifflffl.fflrV 
_% PER ANNUM, TERM BETWEEN 
_ MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
_ _ _ _ _ PER MONTH BASED BETWEEN $ 
ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ „ 
IF SELLER IS NOTABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED, THEN 
SELLER MUST, WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OFTHE DATE OF SALE, MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THATHE/SHEHAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PURCHASERTHEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT, IF HE/SHE CHOOSES, TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401, 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE, THE PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED; 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN; AND 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE. / 
IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER * 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER, INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN. IF THE TRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION, THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE 
. PRICE GIVEN BY THESELLER FOR THE TRADE-IN, AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE. 
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN 
FINANCING. 
SIGNATURE 
OP PURCHASER ' , ; __ 
SIGNATURE 
OF SELLER - '• 
OTHER TERMS A G R E E D T O : 
Pe^tesxT- ew err Ho 
N O N E D AS FOLLOWS D 
OEPsreeo ^ Hewaey C v^j U>^r> 
s* ^ U _ t < 2 . 
_ Insurance company. Policy # _ 2_-
Express Warranty In writing, Seller makes no Warranty, express or implied, with respect to the merchantability, 
described herein. Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty Is limited to that provided by the 
lerhas erranged Insurance on vehicle through 
tated on the reverse side of this document, unless Seller has given to. Purchaser an 
for particular purpose, or otherwise concerning the vehicle, parts or accessories 
ftirer, if any, as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof. 
sr agrees that this contract includes.all of the terms, conditions.and warranties on both the face .and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of 
> hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby. PURCHASER.BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
WENT ACKNOWLEDGES THATjteSflE HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
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CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES 
, IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED: 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof Is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser whi^ h 
have been mutually agreed upori:" ' w n i c n 
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the deliver ni 
such vehicle In the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and t 
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all Hens and encumbr»rw«,cTviBaI 
as otherwise rioted on. me reverse side hereof. «««ioes except 
2, It the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUP by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement then the Setter 
may set off against It's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicle 
has been taken. In trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out 
of the-proceeds of such sale for its expenses arid tosses Incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure tocomDlete 
the purchase."A', ' * ' . ' . . , '_.., ' — . w , 
. 3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, f Iros, or other causes beyond 
the control ot theJSeller. 
4. NO WARRANTIES j EXPRESS &R IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OP THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER, 
EXCEPTING ONLY THfc CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUpH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS, 
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE 
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF .THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING/BUT NOt LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH \U SUCH WARRAIOTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANV 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE'CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOS 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRrtlNG, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADg A PART HEREOF. 
5. In case the vehfcte sold to Purchaser te a usod or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation fc made by M e r as to 
trie exterti such vehicle rras been ussd, regardless of the mjleags shown on In© odometer of said used vehicle. 
6. In the event tt becomes necessaryfor Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement, 
Purchaser agrees, to pay reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her Interest In this Agreement, unless Seller consents In writing. 
B. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT 
9. PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she fs 16 years of age or older, 
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security Interest In the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of thevehlcle to 
secure full payment of the purchase prlce.Thls security Interest covers all equipment, accessories,' and i&rts that purchaser 
adds to the vehfcfa Purchaser also grants Seller a security Interest In the proceeds of any physical damage Insurance policy 
on the vehicle, 
11. If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see dn the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle Is part of this contract. Information on tlie window form overrides any contrary provisions In this contract of sale, 
12. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS; < 
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE 4BfDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT, 
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE: 
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON 
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR-
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILEfe tlrlE TRADEWN VEHIQU HAS BEEN DRIVEN; 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER.GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE^ ANb THAT 
TRANSFER OFTHE TRADEWN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS 
RIGHTFUL; AND 
(e) THATTHE TOADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BHANDED AS» "SALyAQEd", 
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," Oft SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANTTO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41 * 1 »; " W ^ D i« r j« "422! 
OR STATUES) OF ANOTHER STATE ,SUBSTANTIAaY SIMILAR IN CONTENT JF PURCHASER BREACHES T>«S 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY TOEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FORI AND PAYTHE^SELLERTHE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TftADE-W ALLOWANCE AS STATED.ON THE.REVBRSEjBDE AND THE REDUCED 
. VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISRfePRESENTATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISTRATION. 
t& Purchaser also grants the Salter a security interest In the vehicle purchased by Purchaser for the purpose of securing Seller 
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, ft any, of the warranties made In me precede pamgrapn. 
14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser H mailed by ordinary mall, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address 
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be, deemed reasonable and effective notification. 
*!$. The rate of interest as sot forth In thB Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may Involve a variable rate,Jf *»***) 
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit agreement, representing financing to provide iha credit disclosures requireoi oy i««.< 
including disclosures, regarding variable rates of Interest.' - ' w-'- >"*•• 
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mw m vcniULC WN IHAUt 'OF "ALE 03/G4/02:; 
EAL #: 1962 
TQM WflTKINS 
DATE OF SALE 
HENRY DAY FORD INC 
3899 5 REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
PURCHASER'S NAME 
3 5 3 7 EftST 6 2 0 0 SOUTH 
~ STREET ADDRESS 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UT 641S1 
CITY COUNTY STATE 
(861)278-1913 
haser and Co-Purchaser^), If any, (hereafter referred to as "Purchaser) hereby agree to purchase the following vehicle from Seller/Dealer (hereafter referred to as "Seller"), subject to 
rms, conditions, warranties and agreements contained herein, including those printed on the reverse side hereof. 
USED DEMO YEAR 
FORD ST40 
ODOMETER 
03 /04 /02 
SALESPERSON 
V STEVE KERSEY 
PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
CASH PRICE OF V&ilCLE 
ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5) 
MFR. REBATE J*/f iL 
PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 









TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 











RRANTY A S TO B A L A N C E OWED ON TRADED-IN VEHICLE: 
laser warrants that he/she has given Seller a true pay-off amount oh anyi 
e traded in, and that if It Is not correct and is greater than the amount shown 
i, Purchaser will pay the excess to Seller on demand. 
TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN* 
NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN (line 10 minus 11) 
DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit art* line 8) 
TOTAL CREDITS (total lines 12 & 13) 
SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
( iftftfl ftft) 
SERVICE CONTRACT 
SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS (total lines 15-17) 
rRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10) 
METTAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) ft 
N/A 
JTAH SALES/USETAX ON 'TAXABLE AMOUNT' 
N/A 
JCENSE& REGISTRATION FEES 
3R0PERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
STATE INSPECTIOWEMISSIONS TEST 
HATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
EDERALLUXURY TAX 
)EALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 



























THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-IN 











NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The Information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this vehicle is pari of this contract. 
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions In the contract of sale. 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE. 
FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION; One of the two following disclosures, either "A" or MB"r must be acknowledged. If 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing, or if this is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-in only 
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A". If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then both 
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "B". BY SIGNING, PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE 
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO. IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE "B" , DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN. 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(A)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL-
EDGES THATTHE SELLER OFTHE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES, WARRANTIES, 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLER'S ABILITY TO OBTAfN FINANCING FOR THE 
PURCHASE OFTHE MOTOR VEHICLE. FURTHERMORE, PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON-
SIBILITY OF THE PURCHASER. 
SIGNATURE 
OF PURCHASER 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(B)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHiCLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS OFTHE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN. J IZ f f /oAND. 
-N/A- „ MONTHS A N D . 
BETWEEN $ M / f i PER MONTH AND $ _ 
ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ IBflfl.aQ 
_% PER ANNUM, TERM BETWEEN 
__ MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
PER MONTH BASED 
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED, THEN 
SELLER MUST, WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE, MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOTBEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PURCHASER THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT, IF HE/SHE CHOOSES, TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE, PURSUANT!© SECTION 41-3401. 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE, THE PURCHASER SHALL: 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER "WE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED; 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN; AND 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE. 
IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER, INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN. IFTHETRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION, THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE 
PRICE GIVEN BYTHE SELLER FOR THE TRADE-IN, AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE. 
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HfS OWN 
FINANCING. 
SIGNATURE 
OF PURCHASER ' ; , 
SIGNATURE 
OF SELLER -
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: N O N E n AS FOLLOWS • 
2 ^ Qrr^o 
oepr^o bcj l4£o)e.^  DA^F£>£D 
^H^-U^Ut^l 
er has arranged Insurance on vehicle through _ 
_ insurance company. Policy # _ 
ated on the reverse side of this document, unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty In writing, Seder makes no Warranty, express or implied, with respect to the merchantability, 
for particular purpose, or otherwise concerning the vehicle, parts or accessories described herein. Unless otherwise Indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that provided by the 
iturer, If any, as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof. 
>r agrees that this contract Includes all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes arty prior agreement and as of 
• hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered, hereby. PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
rfENT ACKNOWLEDGES THATHE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
F THIS AGR&tyENT, ANDjFMtt f f i AGREES TO PAY THE "BALANCE DUE* SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED. 
( 5 3 / 0 4 / 0 2 VEHICLE TO BE Wfv-rr vfc
 TIRED M ^ g QF 
fe7£ (33/04/33 p = o •f/u-
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CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES 
, IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY A G R E E D : 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions* and warranties made by Purchaser t»u:„k 
have been mutually agreed upon:' • • • . ' • y w "»*•». which 
1, Purchaser agrees to dBliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivan/ 
such vehicle In the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear Jnrt • 
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all Hens and encumhnwuL!?!? -
as otherwise noted on the reverse side hereof. umwanees except • 
2, li the Purchaser does nol pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement then thp «* 
may set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used v S S ? I 
has been fatten. In trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse teslfoui 
of the proceeds of such sale for Its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to^omnlete 
we purchase. . . . ., . . . . . . . ^mno 
. 3. Seller shall not be liable for delays .or damagea caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires or other causes beyond 
the control of the^elier. 
4. NO WARRANTIES- EXPRESSt)R IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE B E E N MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOJOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER, 
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO S U p H VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS, 
WHICH WARRiANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF A N O A COPY O F WHICH WILL B E 
DELIVERED T O PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN U E U OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING/BUT NOt UMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES S E T FORTH \U SUCH WARRANTY WILL B E THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE'CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY B E EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR'MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF S O EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADg A PART HEREOF. 
5. in case the vet jfcte sold to Purchaser fe a used or cerrwttlrator vehicle, no warranty or representation hi manic? by toiler as to 
trie extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the irtage slxiwn on the odometer ol said used vehicle. 
6. In the event It becomes necessary-tor Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in ttiis agreement, 
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorneys fees, court costs, and collection fees. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her Interest in this Agreement, unless Seller consents In writing. 
6. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT 
9. PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older, 
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security interest In the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the: vehicle to 
secure full payment of the purchase price, This security Interest covers all equipment, accessories,'and |&rts: that Purchaser 
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also grants Seller a security Interest h the proceeds of any physical damage Insurance policy 
on the vehicle. 
t i . If the vehicle bought by Purchaser Is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form {Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle is part of this contract. Information on tfie window form overrides any contrary provisions In this contract of sale, 
12. IN T H E C A S E O F ANY VEHICLETRADED IN AS PART O F T H E CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS; < • • % * -
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE -SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL. EQUIPMENT, 
AIR B A G S AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE! ' : , 
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADEO-JN VEHICLE A R E AS STATED O N 
T H E REVERSE SIDE foERfcOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR-
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRAPED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN; 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER.GOOD TITLE TO T H E TRADED-IN VEHICLE; AND THAT 
TRANSFER O F THE TRADE W N VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRAD&JN ON THE PURCHASE O F ANOTHER V E H i C U IS 
RIGHTFUL; AND 
(e) T H A T T H E TOADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED ASI "SALVA6E0* , 
"RESTORED," «REPAIRED,"X)R SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41 - l a - 1 <W A W j M M c ^ « S 
OR STATUES) OF ANOTHER STAT* ..SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT. IF W W W J A r a W f f i A g » W 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURGHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FOR[fiJH>PAYTH£SELLER (THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN T H E TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATE&ON THE.RgVERSE SJDE AND THE REDUCED 
. VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MlSRfePRESENtATION REGARDING T H E T R I E OR REGISTRATION. - . , 
13. Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by PurchSsVfbr the purpose of securing Setter 
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, If any, of the warmntiBS made in me prBcedlng paragrapn. 
14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser H mailed by ordinary mall, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address 
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deomed reasonable and effective notification. 
15. Tt»e rate of interest as sot forth In the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may Involve a variable raJ*» ^ J ? ^ * 
noted. Purchaser will miy on any credit agreement, representing financing to provide the* credit disclosures required oy mw. 
including disclosures regarding variable rates of interest. - 'ruo-.-- r:v • " ' 
jfoUtftftft Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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M a r - - 0 5 - 0 2 0 5 : 1 3 P / ' - » n r y D a y F o r d F l e e t 
SELLER/DEALER: 
8 0 1 9 7 r Z 6 1 9 P , 0 3 
MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE 03/wes 
DEAL t i 196£ TOM HRTKINS 
DATE OF SALE 
HENRY PAY FORD INC 
3699 8 REDWOOD ROW) 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT B«U9 
Pii^NASGR'SNAME 
S537 EftST62WS0UTH 
' ~ SThCETAOOflttW 
SALT L8KE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121 
wr- ' " C O U N T Y 
(6*1)278-1913 
3TA7C IIP COM: 
Curc-tieier end Co-Purchtttr{«}. if nn/, (hereafter referred ID AS "PurtfMiMir") ii<:n% agrn« u> pun*** * (he flowing vehicle irom $«!(etfi)«ii«r (htr««n«r referred lo is "Seller"), subieci to 
•II term*, condiiron*, warrwHiu* ^ n< ?¥«i*»n*mfc <:iwiMrt<«j iwreiri, including Oiow prtnteo on mc revert* «<)• rtertol. 




PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
1. CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE 
2. ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5) 
7*~MFR. REBATE $ UlR. 
a. POrTTIOWREBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 








> STFVF HFRfifY 
THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-IN 
• Title (it not, explain):
 ; 
l !Slsf ia! io»r BILL 
OFSIU 






F O * PAYOFF 
NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The information you sec on the window form (Buyer's GuideJ for this vehicle i* part oi this coniraui. 
infurrDatieii on tliA window form overrides any contrary provisions in ihc contract ot sate. 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE. 
X 
TRADE-IN AND/OR O T H E R CREDITS 
" B O O Y T Y P F 
FINANCING D I S C L O S U R E 
INSTRUCTfON: One of the two following disclosure?;, »Mwr "A" or "B", must t>* ttlwowteikitf. If 
Purchase agrees lo be responsible for Iirancing. or if this is a ensh-only or cnr.h-pli»s-imde-ir» only 
tmnsvfiHori, ifwn Pgrchwor must $kjn disclosure 'A". If Sailor agraas to arrange for financing, then both 
Seller and Purchaser roust 3>gn diKtovre f r . BY SIGNING. P U R C H A S E R AFF IRMS THAT HE/SHE 
MAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO. IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE "6". DO 
NOT 5K5N UNTIL A l t BUHK$ HAVE BEEN FllLtD IN. 
•BALANCE O W E D O N T R A D E T - I N : 









A Q C . Hi 
P U R C H A S E R A G R E E S T O A R R A N G E FINANCING 
"(A)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHIU E DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTHACI ACKNOWL-
EDGES THATTHE SELLER OT THE- MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES. WARRANTIES. 
OH REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SEULKH'S ABILITY TO OBIAlN FINANCING f-OH IHb 
PURCHASE OFTHE VOTOPVEHId£. FURTHERMORE, PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCIMG IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT A a THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOlfc RESPON-
SIHILTY OF THE PURCHASER. 
SIGNATURE 
WARRANTY AS TQ BALANCE OWED ON THADEO-IN VEHICLE 
[Purch«s«r werrente Ihel he/she has siven Seller « (rue pay-off amount on any 
tahicfo traded in. und Unit if K is itfl uorrcrt ami is ywytoi iKtn UK? tinwunl simwil 
khnvR. Purr.hsMr will pay the twee** to Sellftr nn rjamand, 
10. TRADE-IN A110WACI: 
11. BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN' 
12. NET ALLOWANCE ONTRADHN (line 10niinus1l) 
13. DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit ami line 8) 
14..iQTAI,CHf:0HS 
15. SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
(tqfcit«MS1g&l3) 
10. SERVICE CONTRACT 
17. 
18. SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE llfcMS 
19 TRADE ALLOWANCf (linp.10) 
20. NQ TAXABLE-AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus tine 19) & 
(HHlt inKsjS-iyH 
21. UTAH SALESAJSE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT1 
N/fl 
22. LICENSE*REGISIMIONFEES 
23. PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
?4. STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
25, STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
26. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY 5ERVICE FEE 
28 
29/TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE 
30. TOTAL CREDITS 
(Km* 18.21-27). 
(fine 14) 
31. BALANCE DUE 
DAY MONTH 
(total line 29 minus 30) 
.YEAR 
• 4 W A -
•-AUA-I 
- N / R 
S E L L E R A G R E E S T O A R R A N G E FINANCING 
"(ej" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE $ELLEn'S REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHA5E OF THE MOTOR 
VEHlCt E. THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
INTEREST RATE DCTWEEN N / f l M M „.% PER ANNUM. TERM BETWEEN 
N , „ MONTHS AND MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENT.? 










ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ 1 T O B L Oft 
IF SELLER IS NOT ADLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WlTUlN THE TEHM3 UlSClOSbD. I HEN 
SELLER MUST, Wl IHIN SEVEN CALENDAR OAYSOF THE PATE OF SALE, MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOTBEEN ABLE TO ARRANGC TlNANCING. PURCIIA3EK i I (IN 
HA5 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT. IF HE/SHE CHOOSES, TO HUSClND (HL 
CONTRACT OF SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401. 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF $AIE. THE PI JHCHA$EH SHALI: 
(1) RETURN TO SELLERTHE MOTOR VEHICLE PUF1CHA5EO: 
(2) PAYTHC SEUER DU CENTS TOR EACH MILE TI IE MOTOR VEIIICLEI IAS BEEN DHlVbN: ANU 
(3) CQMPfc'NSAIfc SELLER W H ANY PHYSICAL UAMAGfc fO I HE MOlOR VEHICLE. 
IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL DIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS On OTHEn 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER, INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT ANi; ANY 
MOTOR VEI IICLE TRADED IN. IF f H t IHADE-IN HA9 BbbN SOLO OH OrHkHIMSE GI«Pf)HED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION,' THF;N THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASF 
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELIER FOR THF TRADE-IN, AS NOTFDINJHF DOCUMENT OF SALE. 




— m n 
i - t 
359.50 
Purchasor has arranged insurance on vehicle through. 
-W«rW-
OTHER TERMS A G R E E D T O : NONE D AS FOLLOWS D 
^fe-i 
_ BTsufanon company. Polity # 
As Js staled on foe reverse skte of th« d^unwnl, urdest S«II«T hue gw«n lo Punchww an Exprws Warranty in writing, Sdlcr makes no Wanwity. express or implied, with lesped lo ihp. memrwrtiihiliiy, 
fitness for particular purpose, or otherwise pirwwning ihe vehicle, part* or aweseorte dflswfb«d ho«in. Unlaw oihorwteo rndicotc;* In writing, ony warranty is limited to that provided by the 
manufacturer, if any, as explfiinffd nnd mntfiiiarted by Paragraph 4 on the nvera« aide hereol. 
Purchaser agrees that this contrttf inctafos B« of fi» laniis. wndltons arttj wrrantk» on both the face and reverse safe hereof, rhm trw agiMment wm»ls and supmtcfes any priw agreement and as ut 
the date hareof comprises the complete and ewk»si^ xtatemwi of irw t«nms of iho agreemont rdatinrj lo the subject miners cow* * hereby. PURCHASER BV H J S ^ E R EXECUTION O F THIS 
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HEiBHE HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVEO A IHUfc 
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT. A N a T O J j f e AGREES TO PAY THE "BALANCE DUE* SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPEOPIEn. 
" ^ DATE » 3 / 8 « t / l g g Tn^DMNAMFflP 
Afprmypn n«r»4 rnsu iwit uui- nrt/ i M 
ewt^ 
- K 7 V C 7 K Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES 
, HIS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED: 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Ptwhaser whirh 
have been mutually agreed upori: 'Wicn 
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery nf 
such vehicle in the same condition and containing thB same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and te 
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property tree and clear of all Hens and encumbrance *w!fl!!l 
as otherwise rioted on. the reverse side hereof. • ^ s ****& 
2, It the Purchaser does noi pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse aide of this agreement then the Setter 
may set off against It's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicle 
has been taken in trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out 
of the-proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses Incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure tocom&teie 




 » ' • ' . * 
. 3, Seller shall not be liable for delays .pr damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond 
the control of thejSeller. 
4. NO WARRANTIES,' EXPRESS OR IMPUED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER, 
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUpH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE 
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING/BUT NOT LJWHTED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SJSJ FORTH \U SUCHWARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE'CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR'MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MAD£ A PART HEREOF. 
5. in case the vehfcte sold to Purchaser Is a "used or Demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation fc rnacfc by bailer as to 
the extort! such vehicte has teen used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odomeler ol said used vehicle. 
6. In the event It becomes necessary-for Seller to enforce any of the. terms, conditions or warranties in tills agreemsnt, 
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her Interest In this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing. 
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT 
9. PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older, 
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security Interest In the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the: vehfcie to 
secure full payment of the purchase prfce.This security Interest covers all equipment, accessories,'and i&rts that Purchaser 
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also giants Seller a security Interest h the proceeds of any physical damage insurance policy 
cnthevebfcte, 
VI. II the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle Is part of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions In this contract of sale, 
12. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS; < : • • * • * -
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL-EQUIPMENT 
AIR BAGS AND AI4- SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE: 
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADEO-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON 
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR-
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILEfc THE TRAPED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN; 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND Witt. PROVIDE TO SELLER.GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE^ AND THAT 
TRANSFER OF THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS 
RIGHTFUL;AND 
(e) THATTHE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED", 
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TfcRM, PURSUANTTO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41 - 1a -1004 AND £1 rVJ« -1005 
OR STATUES) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IM CONTENT. IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY TOBN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE UABLE FOR AND PAYTHE SELLERI THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TAADE-4N ALLOWANCE AS STATCDON THE REVERSE SIDE AND THE REDUCED 
. VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE TTTtE OR REGISTTf AT10N. 
13. Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by PurcbSsVfbr the purpose of securing Seller 
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, if any, of tfw warranties made in the preceding paragraph. 
14. Any written notice required to ba given Purchaser if mailed by ordinary mail, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address 
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deemed reasonable and'effective notification. 
15. Tlie rate of interest as sot forth In the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may Involve a variable rate, II therein 
noted. Purchaser will mty on any credit agreement.representing financing to provide tha credit disclosures required oy law.* 
Inclining disclosures regarding variable rates of interest. - - - , . - • • • • . 
*s... 4* 
..•.JSMATSWI*-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mar--05-02 05:13P/"-»nry Day Ford Fleet 8 0 1 9 7 ^ 2 6 1 9 P.OZ 
SELLER/DEALER: 
DEftl 9l 1961 
MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE 03/04/0? 
lOMJfflTlUNS 
DATE OF SALE 
HENRY DRY FORD INC 
3899 S REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST VftLLEY CITY UT 84119 
rUHCHWCfTO NAME 
2537 Ef\5T 6200 SOUTH 
T " .<TAF.R *rtr>9^ 
SflLT L«iE CITY SALT LfiKE UT 6412X 
COUNTY C f T -
(001)870 
^ S T T - " itpcooc 
1913 
B^fMOWif"" 
Pit fdUMf JinO C0-PurCft*3ir<S|, « »»1y, {hir«#««r r#»»««d It) * * 'Pur thWCO h»nsl»y AQA* to purcn*M Ihl MlAwirtij w>hfcte tiftm Sislktf/Ofsilwi {lH!iteifl<*i u r i n a l In ;j!?%&£en suUni In 
ell lermt, conwions, wimnu«» «nd agreements corrtiineo h«t«in, including tnoM pitntod on tru w m i e tide hereof. 
MAKE 
FORD GT 40 
BOOYTYFE 
roji UA()> 
« / • * / • » > 
SALtSHfcHSON 
V STFVF KFBSFY 
PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
1. CASHFHICf'QFWmr 1 ' N/fl 
2. ACCCS50RirS/0PTroN5 
6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (Mid lines 1-5} 
7. MFR. REBATE $ N/f l 
ft. PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 







WARRANTY AS T O B A L A N C E OWED O N TRAOED-IN V E H I C L E ; 
[Muidv.wf WiViO'ilv Unit hc/stic liii<> yivuti Solter a true pay-oft amount on nnyl 
vflhidft rratfcri in. nnd ih.il it it is not cnti<wt iwl »s QrcotCf UKIM ||IU on tout it SIKWII 
|ubgvc, Pwdrawr will pay the vncoss to Seller on demend. 
-N/A-
TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
ODOMETER 
SFRTFS" flOllY TV*1? 
'BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN: 







G O O D 
UNTIL: 
AGO. #. 
10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE 
11. BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN'" 
12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN \Um 1U minus 11} 
13. DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMbWr (rnnit arrA: .Jim flH _ 
14. 10JALCHEUI1S (tnf{i<linop"l?Fl3) ~" 
15. SUB-TOTAIFR0MUME0 
1fi. SFRVICF CONTRACT 
17. 
18. SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS 
IS. TRADE ALLOWANCE {lints 10) 
20. NET TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) 
(total Imcs 15- V ) 
21. UTAHSALESMSE IAX ON 'IAXABU AMOUNT 
22. LICENSE^REGISTRATION FEES 
N/a 
-jwfc 
23. PROPERTY ASSESSMEr\fTFEE(S) 
24. STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCUNC FEE 
26. fEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FtE 
28. 
29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 18,21-27) 
30. TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 
31. B A L A N C E D U E 
DAY MONTH YEAR 
(tout line 29 minus 30) 














- * / * 
~389rW-
-4409,00 
THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-IN 








FOR PAYOFF ' 
NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The jniomiHiioo you sef on the window form (Buyer's GukJcJ for tfiis vohiclc is part or this contract. 
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in ihe contract of SHIM. 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USfcU CAR HUYfcHS GUIDE, 
X ^ _ _ 
FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION. Ono of thu two followmy dsckwcm*, either "A" or TT. niusl be acknowledged. If 
Puatawvr agwiK to t*» (expnn?lt»le for rvmncmQ, or i| ifiis is a cash-only or co$hpluM»ade-in wily 
twmotion, »mn PiKchwerTngst sign disclosure *A". K Seller 30/06$ 10 arrange for lirwrofog, thRn both 
5«lter w d Purchaser must sign disclosure -D". BY SIGNING. PUHCHASER A F F I R M S T H A T HE/SHE 
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGHcES THERETO. IF SIQNJN5 PISCIOSURE "6", DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE 6EEH FILLED IN. 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(A)" THE PURCHASfcH OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED (N THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL-
kOGES THAT THE SEUER. OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES. W A R R A N T S 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLER'S ABILITY 10 OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE 
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE. FURTl IERMORE, HUHCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN OHDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE Tl IE PAYMtM 
TERMS OF IHJS CONTRACT All . THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON-
8IBILTY OF THE PURCHASER. 
5IGNMWC 
or puRciwaFh 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
-(B)" R ib PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED JN THIS CONIHACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTHACl IN HbUANCE UPON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION lHAi 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE TlNANCtNG AHHANKEMFNTS FOP THE PURCHASE OT THE MOIOH 
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS OT THt FINANCING ARE AS FOl LOWS. 
INTEREST RAlfc Ukl WtfcN fl/tfi AND *+. PER ANNUM. TERM Ukl WfcfcN 
N / r t MONTHS ANU MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
DETWEENS . . . .^ f tUf i PER MONTH AND? PtHMONIHBASED 
O N A D O W N P A Y M F N T O F ? . . 1 0 0 0 , 0 0 
IF S R I ER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGl \ INANC1NU WITHIN THE TERMS DISCI OSED. THEN 
SELLER MUST, WITI ||N SCVfcN CALtNUAH DAYS OF THF RATE OF SALE. MAIL NOTICE TO Tl IE 
PURCt IASERI MAI NL/SHfc HAS NOT BFFN AR1F TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PUttCl IA$kH THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT. IF HE/SHE CHOOSLS. IO HKHCINO THF 
CONTRACT OF SALE, PURSUANT TO 5ECTION 41-M01. 
IN OnDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOIOH VkHJOE PURCHASED; 
("4 PAY Tl IE SLLIUH SO CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN. AND 
(3) COMPkNSArE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VCHlCLC. 
IN RETURN. SELLER SHALL GIVE OACK TO IHk PUHUHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THk PUHCHA3EH, INCLUniNG ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY 
MOTOR VEl HCLb fHADED IN. IF THE TRAnFtN HAS BEEN SOLO OR OTHERWISE DlSPOSfcU OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION, THEN Tf It SfcLLkH SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCk TOWARD THE PURCHA5E 
rntCE GIVEN BY THE SELLER TOR Tl IE iVtAUk-IN. AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE. 
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSUHk DOkS NOI PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN 
FINANCING. 
ftlfiMATUW, 
OF PURCHASE H _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
SIONATVNt 
WSELIW _ 
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: N D N E Q AS FOLLOWS D 
oeP'^e€t> *><\ \*&**^ E**| VZ>tzo 
^WnCHrttrt R>_ A^s^p 
insuranta twnp«ny. Poficy 1 _ 
<?rft**«\ 
Pwfcnas9f fws w^v duu/ence on veiucie thrown 
As is stated on the reverse side ol this document, unless Seller nas given to Purchaser on Express Warranty in writing, Sdcr mokes no Warranty. wm> or m M , with rtsued to tt« merMahfty, 
fitness for particular purpose, or oihcrwiso concerning trie vehicle, pons or acccssorios described herein. Unless otherwise ind)»t«(f kt mWig, my warranty » timitod <g that provided by it* 
maMiUdiittr, it 9% u viptained *iKf condition^ by P^a^ipti 4 on llie twm skte heroof. 
Purchasfi agtw Hiat lint contract includes ill ot the lenm. corxtiQons arid warranties on both the faoo and reverse side Iwroef, that this egrwiwnt CHIMIS and supersedes eny pnor ^ mmi* and us ul 
the dele ter*)t comprises the nompMtt nnri fiirtiiuvt stnt«rn«nt ol the hwis ol Uw «yr««rrwM i*\m$ fo the Sub|«Ct \\*im uOvvreU lw«uy. PURCHASER BY HfSfflER EXECUTION OF THIS 
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES T H A T j p s R E HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
COPY OF THIS ABREEMENTjMpTj^JHER AGREES TO PAY THE BALANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVt ON OH BEFOHl THE DATE SPECIFIED. 
WwJ.liStiSEaSfcfflbor 
MPHWtO UADAFOriM IflOtl MVP QtU l tvi t / i u n > w « r*ll 
SlGKATUni 
wscuen. . . ' f c _ . 
O3/0A/Bc 
- d U t . ^ PAH . 
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CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES 
• .. IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED: 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof Is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser whirh 
have been mutually agreed upon:' ' 
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the deliverv of 
such vehicle In the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and »« 
excepted, and Purchaser warranto such used vehicle to be his property tree and clear of ail liens and encumbranrj»TJ!!!^ 
as otherwise rioted on. the reverse side hereof. «"«ww except • 
2, It the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse aide of this agreement then the SellBr 
may set off against It's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser, In the event a used vehicle 
has been taken In trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to "sell the used vehicle, arid Seller snail be entitled to reimburse itself out 
of the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and IOSSBS incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure tooomptete 
the purchase.". ' **" ;
 t "^ ' — . ^ , 
. 3. Seller shad not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond 
the control of theJSeller. 
A. NO WARRANTIES; EXPRESS <DR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OFTHE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER, 
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT. PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUpH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE 
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OFTHE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN UEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING.BUT NOt LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES S$T FORTH l*J SUCHWARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE 70 ANV 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TOSUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE'CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE ORM.OTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MAD£ APART HEREOF. 
5. In case the vefjfcte sold to Purchaser'% a used or demoixstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation fc marie by toiler as to 
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer oi said used vehicle. 
6. in the event it becomes necessary-for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreemsnt, 
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her Interest In this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing. 
B. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT 
9. PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is .18 years of age or older, 
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security Intereet In the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the:vehicle to 
secure full payment of the purchase price, This security Interest covers all equipment, accessories,'and p&fls that Purchaser 
adds to the vehtete. Purchaser also grants Seller a security Interest h the prooeedb of any physical damage Insurance policy 
on the vehicle. 
Tl. If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form {Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle is part of this contract, Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions h this contract of sale, 
12. iN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OFTHE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER. 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS; < 
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT, 
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE'. ' 
\h) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED^ VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON 
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR-
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED4N VEHIQU5 HAS BEEN DRIVEN; 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER.GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADEWN VEHICLE; AND THAT 
TRANSFER OFTHE TRADE-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON "THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS 
RIGHTFUL; AND 
(e) THAT THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED', 
"RESTORED," *BEPAtRED,"t)R SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41 - 1a -1004 AND.f1
 rj« -1005 
OR STATUES) OF ANOTHER STATE ..SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE UABLE FOR AND PAYTHE SELLER THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TT&DE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED. ON THE REVERSE SfflDE AND THE REPUCED 
. VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISRfePRESENfrATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISffiATlON. 
t3. Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest In the vehicle purchased by PurchSSer for the purpose of scouring Seller 
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, If any, of the warranties made In the preceding paragraph. 
14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser If mailed by ordinary mall, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address 
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be, deemed reasonable andeffective notation. 
15. Hie rate of interest as sot forth In the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may Involve a variable rata, If therein • 
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit -agreement, representing financing to provide tha credit disclosures required by fawn 
including disclosures, regarding variable rates of Interest, - —... J 
.: JIBS*" ftfl*-
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-»'-•«/ District 
MAV - 5 2009 
SALT I.AKE COUNTY 
rBi 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'eputy Clerk 
TOM WATKINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HENRY DAY FORD, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 050911728 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
The above-entitled matter having come before this Court for trial on March 3, 2009, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by his attorneys, John 
B. Wilson and John P. Ball. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The 
Court having heard the argument of counsel, received evidence and testimony, reviewed the 
pleadings and papers filed in this matter, including supplemental Memoranda submitted on or about 
March 9, 2009, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff has been an owner of one or more motor vehicle dealerships since 1989 and 
has been involved in the retail automobile business in various capacities since 1968. 
2. In 2002 Ford announced that it was going to build the Ford GT 40. 
3. Also on March 2,2002, plaintiff offered to pay defendant $ 1,000.00 for each vehicle 
as a down payment. 
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WATKINS V. HENRY DAY FORD PAGE 2 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
4. At the time plaintiff met with Mr. Kersey, defendant did not have any GT 40's in its 
inventory, 
5. The first meeting between Mr. Kersey and the plaintiff lasted about 15 minutes. 
During the meeting Mr. Kersey did not leave, nor did Mr. Kersey speak with anyone else about the 
plaintiffs requested purchase. 
6. Mr. Kersey during this meeting indicated to the plaintiff that he would have to speak 
with the General Manager of defendant when he returned to work on Monday to obtain permission 
to accept plaintiffs offer to purchase two (2) GT 40 automobiles. 
7. The following Monday Steve Kersey did meet with the General Manager and inquired 
whether he could enter into the transaction to sell two (2) Ford GT 40fs to the plaintiff. 
8. Though defendant did not have any GT 40's on its lot, nor did the dealership know 
if it would be allocated any GT 40's to sell, at that time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter 
into a contract(s) to sell plaintiff Ford GT 40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted to 
defendant. 
9. Mr. Kersey called the plaintiff the following Monday and indicated that defendant 
would sell the plaintiff two (2) GT 40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the vehicles. 
10. Later that same Monday, the plaintiff came to the defendant's location and Mr. 
Kersey prepared two (2) written Motor Vehicle Contracts of Sale (the "Contracts"), dated March 4, 
2002, for Ford GT 40 automobiles. 
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WATKINS V. HENRY DAY FORD PAGE 3 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
11. It was undisputed that plaintiff specifically requested that defendant sell him Ford GT 
40 automobiles and plaintiffs request was specifically referenced in the Contracts which were 
executed by the plaintiff and defendant 
12. Mr. Kersey's meeting on March 4,2002 with Mr. Watkins lasted approximately 15 
minutes during which time Mr. Kersey again did not leave the room where he and Mr. Watkins were 
meeting and again he did not speak to anyone regarding whether defendant would be allocated any 
Ford GT 40's. 
13. Plaintiff reviewed the Contracts which specified that the automobile to be purchased 
by plaintiff was a Ford "GT 40", found them to be accurate, and signed both written Contracts, as 
did Mr. Kersey on behalf of defendant. 
14. The plaintiff offered to pay a deposit for each GT 40 and the defendant required a 
deposit of $1,000.00 before the contract would be prepared. 
15. The plaintiff did tender to the defendant $1,000.00 for each automobile and the 
defendant did accept plaintiff s deposit. 
16. Each Contract specified a down payment in the amount of $ 1,000.00. 
17. Each of the Contracts also provided in the "memo" portion of the Contract as 
follows: "MEMO: deposits on GT40". 
18. None of the Contracts executed by the parties specified a delivery date. At the time 
the parties executed the Contracts, defendant was uncertain as to when or if it would receive the Ford 
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WATKINS V. HENRY DAY FORD PAGE 4 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
GT 40's. Plaintiff believed at the time the Contracts were executed that it could take as long as two 
years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40's. 
19. The following day the plaintiff called Mr. Kersey and indicated that he wanted the 
Contracts modified to include the purchase price was for MSRP. 
20. The plaintiff did not indicate in this later call in which he requested the Contracts be 
modified that the Contracts were in error or needed any further modifications. 
21. Mr. Kersey included the requested language in the Contracts and faxed the Contracts 
as modified to the plaintiff. 
22. At no time in 2002 did plaintiff ask to purchase a Ford GT from defendant. 
23. At the end of 2002, after defendant had held plaintiffs deposit for over eight months, 
Jeremy Day inquired why plaintiffs deposit was being held since there had been no indication that 
the defendant would be allocated any Ford GT 40's. 
24. Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, called the defendant's Ford representative to 
inquire if defendant would be allotted any Ford GT 40's. 
25. Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that the defendant was not, as a smaller Ford 
dealer going to be allotted any Ford GT 40's unless the defendant won the Ford President's Award 
or Ford's National Car and Truck Share Award. 
26. Defendant had never, in its 40 year history, received either the President' s Award or 
National Share Award from Ford. 
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27. Based upon the fact that defendant would not be allocated a Ford GT40 to sell, the 
defendant, on December 31,2002, returned plaintiffs $2,000.00 deposit with a letter which stated: 
"[e]nclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to inform 
you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." 
28. Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced automobile dealer and as such 
would be very familiar with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his deposit without 
objection or reservation of any type. Based upon plaintiffs experience in the auto dealership 
industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited the check because he did not know what to do with the 
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had 
with the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within a reasonable time of receiving the letter 
and check to assert or enforce his contract rights. 
29. It was not until February 2004, over two years after plaintiff accepted the return of 
his deposit, that defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon defendant being 
awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year. 
30. In April 2004, defendant was notified by Ford that it would be receiving the 
President's Award based upon defendant's 2003 automobile sales and would be allocated another 
FordGT. 
31. Ford invoiced defendant for the first Ford GT on December 9,2004. 
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32. Defendant received actual delivery of the December 9, 2004 invoiced Ford GT on 
May 31,2005. 
33. Ford invoiced defendant for the second Ford GT on May 31, 2005. 
34. The Ford GT represented in the May 31, 2005 was not available for delivery until 
July 20, 2005 
35. In June of 2005 the plaintiff for the first time demanded defendant sell him aFord GT 
model vehicle even though the plaintiff had contracted to purchase Ford GT 40 vehicles and plaintiff 
had accepted without objection the return of his deposit. 
36. Defendant refused to sell to plaintiff in June of 2005 a Ford GT vehicle. 
37. In or about the summer of 2005, defendant was informed by Ford that it would be 
allocated a Ford GT. 
38. In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to plaintiff for MSRP the Ford 
GT which had been allocated to defendant. 
39. Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford GT. Plaintiffs refusal to 
purchase the Ford GT constitutes a failure of plaintiff to mitigate his damages. 
40. Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without reservation, obj ection, or condition, 
unequivocally demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts. 
41. Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant over two (2) years after 
plaintiff accepted a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that defendant returned 
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plaintiffs check in good faith and based upon the reasonable belief they would not be allotted any 
FordGT40's. 
42. Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights 
to purchase the subject vehicles from defendant. 
The Court having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and 
complete expression of the parties' bargain. 
2. The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements. 
3. The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based upon the plain meaning 
contained in the Contracts. 
4. The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff a "Ford GT 40". 
5. Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, defendant did not breach 
the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
6. The Contracts specifically provide that plaintiff contracted to purchase two (2) "Ford 
GT 40" automobiles. Plaintiff now claims that he contracted to purchase Ford GT automobiles, 
which claim differs from the actual Contracts. 
7. Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the Contracts. 
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8. Defendant's return of plaintiff s deposit represented conduct inconsistent with the 
continued existence of the Contract, and plaintiffs negotiation of defendant's check in the amount 
of $2,000.00 without reservation or objection constituted conduct inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the Contract after the plaintiff negotiated the return of his deposit. 
9. The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts. 
10. Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and his subsequent inaction clearly 
demonstrate plaintiffs voluntary relinquishment of his known rights particularly with plaintiffs 
experience in the auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when and if defendant 
would receive the contracted vehicles. 
11. Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint 
must be dismissed. 
12. Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be 
proven by Affidavit. Counsel for defendant is instructed to submit a Judgment and Affidavit in 
support of reasonable attorney fees and costs consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7(f), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Dated this ~> day of May, 2009. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, to the following, this Dday of May, 2009: 
John B. Wilson 
John P. Ball 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney for Defendant 
438 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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